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Summary findings
Until 1980, Turkey's financial system was shaped to  rather than their efficiency. Deregulation and
support state-oriented development. After the 1960s, the  liberalization should be continued  and strengthened.
financial system, dominated by commercial banks,  - The entry of small-scale firms alone is not enough to
became an instrument of planned industrialization.  increase competition,  so new banks should probably not
Turkey had an uncompetitive financial market and an  be expected to alter the market structure.
inefficient banking system. Controlled  interest rates,  *  To promote competition will require addressing
directed credit, high reserve requirements and other  barriers to both entry and mobility. The main barrier to
restrictions on financial intermediation, and restricted  mobility seems to be the size of the large banks, which
entry of new banks  - plus the exit of many banks  exerts a significant negative effect on competition.
betwee 1960 and 1980 - created a concentrated  market  *  Interbank  rivalry among the leading banks can't be
dominated by banks owned by industrial groups with  facilitated without creating new banks of a certain size
oversized branch networks and high overhead costs.  with a reasonable number of branches. Breaking up
Turkey since 1980 has seen a trend toward  public banks (which hold 30 percent  of sectoral assets,
liberalization of its financial market. Reforms eliminated  excluding the Agricultural Bank and three development
interest rate controls, eased the entry of new financial  banks) could help create 15 to 20 new banks with 40 to
institutions, and allowed new types of instruments.  50 branches. This would reduce concentration  and
Regulatory barriers were relaxed, attracting many banks  improve mobility in retail banking.
(both Turkish and foreign) into the system, and Turkey's  *  Breaking up the public banks before privatization
banking system became integrated with world  markets.  would probably also improve their governance structures
Denizer examines how reform has changed the  and efficiency.
system, focusing on Turkey's commercial retail banking  * Promoting the entry of nonbanks and local banks
market. He finds that:  would also increase the number of institutions competing
- Although reform reduced concentration  in the  for deposits.  Turkey lacks a healthy variety of credit
industry, leading banks are still able to coordinate their  institutions and should consider developing a mortgage
pricing decisions overtly. High profitability appears to  market and creating institutions for housing finance.
have resulted from the banks' uncompetitive pricing
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I. INTRODUCTION
Until 1980,  the Turkish  financial  system  developed  under  an umbrella  of monetary  and  regulatory
policies  aimed  at supporting  the state  orchestrated  development  strategy. Particularly  after  the early 1960s,
the commercial  bank  dominated  financial  system  became  an instrument  of planned  industrialization  policies
and  operated  under  a framework  characterized  by controlled  interest  rates,  directed  credit  programs,  high
reserve  requirements,  and other  restrictions  on financial  intermediation,  as well  as restncted  entry. While
these  financial  and  regulatory  policies  were  not exclusive  to Turkey  and  contributed  to its industrialization,
they  had their  costs on the  banking  system's  competitiveness  and efficiency.'  Interest  rate controls  led to
non-price  competition  in the  form of branch  network  building  by banks  already  in the system. This situation
and restrictive  entry  policies,  coupled  with  the exit  of significant  number  of banks  between  1960-80,  gave
rise to concentrated  market  dominated  by public  and  private  banks  owned  by industrial  groups  with
excessively  large  branch  networks  and  high  overhead  costs. In retrospect,  it is generally  thought  that the
combination  of these  factors created  an uncompetitive  market  structure  and an inefficient  banking  system.
In contrast,  the  years  since 1980  have  seen  a major  trend  toward  the liberalization  of financial
markets  in Turkey.  Starting  in June 1980,  as part of a far reaching  stabilization  and structural  adjustment
program,  the Government  implemented  financial  liberalization  and deregulation  measures  aimed  at
1 As  pointed  out  by  Vives  (1991),  and  Mayer  and  Vives  (1993)  until  the  advent  of  global  financial
deregulation  in  the 1970s  most  countries,  both  developed  and  developing,  followed  restrictive  financial  and  regulatory
policies.  See  also  OECD  (1992).  However,  it is  worthwhile  noting  that  financial  restriction  did  not  turn  into  financial
repression  in  industrialized  countries  while  it did  in  industrializing  ones.2
developing  an efficient  and  competitive  financial  system  that would  support  and facilitate  the functioning  of a
liberal  economy.  To that end,  reforms  eliminated  interest  rate controls,  eased  the  entry  of new  financial
institutions,  both bank  and non-bank,  and allowed  new  types of instruments.  There  were  also policy
measures  to develop  equity  and bond  markets. Although  there  were  occasional  setbacks  and  policy  reversals
in terms  of interest  rate controls,  and a banking  crisis  in 1982,  reforms  have  led  to major  changes  in the
sector. Relaxation  of regulatory  barriers  has attracted  a significant  number  of banks  into  the system,  both
Turkish  and foreign.  Reforms  were  also successful  in halting  the decline  in financial  intermediation  observed
prior  to 1980  and contributed  to financial  deepening  and a revitalization  of the stock  market. At the same
time  product  variety  increased  and quality  of financial  services  improved.  Moreover,  the Turkish  banking
system  became  more  integrated  with  the external  financial  world  and improved  its financial  technology  and
human  capital.
The  objective  of this paper  is to examine  several  aspects  of the  banking  market  in Turkey  to assess
the nature  of its structure  and  the state  of competition.  What  kind of market  structure  exists in banking  after
the reforms?  Was  the entry  of new  banks sufficient  to transform  the  market  structure  into  a competitive  one
or did the distortions  resulting  from  earlier  financial  and  regulatory  policies  built  endogenous  constraints  into
the system  thwarting  competition  regardless  of new  entry? Now  that regulatory  entry  barriers  are gone,  are
there  mobility  barriers  in the system?  These  are  some  of the questions  this study  attempts  to provide  answers
by drawing  on market  structure  studies  found  in industrial  organization  literature  and applying  them  to the
Turkish  banking  market. The  focus  is on the commercial  retail  banking  market  since  it is primarily  through
this channel  that resources  are  mobilized  and allocated.  However,  it must be noted  at the outset  that although
recent  developments  in theory  have  improved  our  understanding  of financial  intermediation,  there  is still no3
fully  developed  theoretical  model  of banking  competition  and  that the quantitative  results  of this study  must
be interpreted  with  caution. 2
The  paper  is organized  as follows. Section  II briefly  examines  the evolution  of the  banking  market  in
Turkey  and identifies  the set of factors  which  shaped  its structure  since  the establishment  of the Republic  in
1923  until  the late 1970s. These  issues  are  notjust of historical  interest. They  are  reviewed  to understand
the relationship  between  overall  development  and  financial  policies,  and more  precisely,  the cumulative
impact  of these  policies  on bank  market  structure  and  competition.  Section  III  reviews  the 1980  financial
sector  reforms  and analyzes  the developments  in banking  market  structure,  including  a review  of data on exit,
entry,  various  measures  of market  concentration,  and  bank profitability.  Section  IV  presents  the methods
used  and hypotheses  tested  in this study  as well  as their  underlying  rationale(s)  as well  as the data. Results
are discussed  in section  V. Finally  section  VI assesses  the impact  of reforms  in light of results  obtained,
raises  some  fundamental  issues  and  problems  and discusses  policy  options  to facilitate  competition  in the
system. In the process,  some  international  comparisons  are  also  made.
'For a recent discussion of the theory  of the banking firm and competition as well as the issues involved in
assessing the benefits of increased competition  in banking from a theoretical point of view, see Mayer and Vives (1993)
and the articles therein.4
II. DEVELOPMENT  POLICIES AND  THE FINANCIAL  SYSTEM  IN RETROSPECT
H. 1. The 1923-50  Period
At the  time modern  Turkey  was established  in 1923,  the formal  financial  system  comprised  of 35
banks,  of which  22 were  Turkish  owned  and 13 were  foreign  with a total of 439 branches. 3 Most of the
foreign  banks  dealt  with  foreign  trade  and foreign  companies  operating  in Turkey  and their  involvement  with
Turkish  firms  was  limited. On  the other  hand,  Turkish-owned  banks  were  mostly  small  local  banks and  were
too weak  to support  the  newly  emerging  industry  and commerce.  During  the  first Economics  Congress  held
in Izmir  in 1923,  it was  emphasized  that the country  suffered  from scarcity  of capital,  and  that without
establishing  a national  banking  system  the country  would  not industrialize  (Akguc  1987). It was also  argued
that the  banks  should  take the  initiative  in financing  large  industrial  enterprises  and the State  should  provide
capital  for new  banks  since  the  private  sector  was  too weak  to provide  it or simply  did  not have  capital.
The  conference  had a significant  impact  on economic  issues  in general,  and  on banking  and  credit  in
particular,  and  influenced  government  policies  in the following  years. During  1923-32,  in parallel  to its
broad  strategy  of industrialization  via private  sector  encouragement,  the Government's  regulatory  approach  to
banking  and finance  was quite  liberal  and aimed  at developing  a national  banking  system. While  the
Government  provided  the  initial  capital  for 4 public  banks  which  still  exist  today  and lead  development
efforts,  it allowed  and actively  encouraged  the  formation  of private  banks. As a result,  about  29 new  private
banks,  mostly  single  branch  and local  were  established.  There  were  practically  no restrictions  for entry. By
3For a more detailed account of the evolution  of banking in Turkey  which this section draws upon heavily, see
Akguc (1987).5
1932,  the number  of banks  reached  to 60, of which  45 were  national,  up from 13 in 1923,  and 15  were
foreign.  However,  the most  important  event  of this period  was  the foundation  of the Central  Bank in 1930.
These  liberal  economic  policies  did  not last long  however. In the  early 1930s,  partly  due to
worldwide  depression  and  partly due  to the  realization  that  the private  sector  was  too weak  to be the engine  of
growth,  the government  adopted  a new  strategy.  This new  strategy,  generally  labelled  as "etatist",
emphasized  state led  development  and assigned  a secondary  role  for the pnvate  sector. In order  to accelerate
industrialization,  the government  established  state  enterprises  in key industries  during  the 1932-45  period
which  are still  in operation.  The  important  aspect  of this  period  for banking  was  the creation  of new  public
banks  to provide  support  for the new  state  enterprises.  Although  there  was  no significant  change  in the
Government's  regulatory  policy  in the  aforementioned  period,  there  was  no entry  into  the system. In fact,  this
period  was  characterized  by the exit of  most small  private  local  banks  due  to the economic  slowdown  in
Turkey  resulting  from  the global  economic  crisis  and the advent  of the Second  World  War. In turn,  these
developments  reduced  the number  of banks  in the system  and increased  the dominance  of public  banks in the
sector. The  number  of banks  fell  to 40 in 1945. During  the  same  period  the number  of branches  also fell  to
411 from 483.
II. 2. The 1950-80  Period
The  years  following  World  War  II to the 1950s  on the other  hand  reflect attempts  to reduce  the  role
of the state  in the economy  and the expansion  of the  private  sector. On  the  banking  side,  the  period  between
1944-1960  was  characterized  by the  entry  of 27 private  banks and  3 public  banks,  including  Akbank,  Yapi  ve
Kredi  Bankasi,  Garanti  Bankasi,  and T. Sinai  Kalkinma  Bankasi.  By 1958  there  were  62 banks  in the6
system,  a number  which  was  not surpassed  until 1989. The  number  of bank branches  increased  by about
fourfold  and  reached  to 1,759  by 1959  and  the process  of nationwide  branching  was  well  underway.
However,  most of the newly  established  banks  did not stay  in the system  long  and 10 small  Turkish-owned
banks,  and 4 foreign  banks  were  liquidated  between  1945-59.  With  a net entry  of 16  banks  between  1944-60
and a small  number  of mergers  among  the existing  banks,  the  total number  of banks  in the system  at the end
of 1960  was 59. The  slowdown  in economic  activity  towards  the end  of the 1950s,  the 1958  recession,  and
the Government's  stabilization  program  led  to further  failures.  Between  1960-64,  15  more  small  banks  ended
their  operations,  some  were  liquidated  and  some  were  merged  with others  which  brought  the number  of banks
to 49 and  the number  of branches  to 1909  by the end of 1964.
The  start of a planned  development  strategy  in 1963,  and  to a lesser  degree  concerns  over  the failure
of a large  number  of banks  during  the  early 1960s,  brought  significant  changes  to banking  and finance  policy.
In order  to attain  plan  targets,  the public  sector  increasingly  assumed  a larger  role  in the allocation  and
mobilization  of resources  through  directed  credit  programs,  subsidized  lending  to priority  sectors  and  other
constraints  on financial  intermediation.  Cumulatively,  these  measures  turned  the financial  system  into an
instrument  of industrialization  policy. While  the efficiency  of this arrangement  in terms  of directing  credit
according  to plan  targets  was questioned  by Akyuz  (1984)  it remained  in effect  until late 1980. There  were
no changes  in interest  rate policy  however.  Like  before,  interest  rates  were  administratively  set by the
government  and this policy  was  not specific  to the planned  era. Since  1940s  deposit  interest  were  controlled
by the  govermment  and  they  were  changed  only  5 or 6 times  between  1940  and 1978.5 In general,  however,
the impact  of these  policies  was  to increase  the role  of the State  in financial  markets.  According  to Hanson
and  Neal  (1986),  around  only  a quarter  of total  credit  was  free  from  government  control  as late as 1983.
'See the tables  presented  at the end  of Fry's  1979  book  entitled  Money  and  Banling  in Turkey.7
Unsurprisingly,  the adoption  of planned  development  strategy  in 1963  also brought  significant
changes  to the regulatory  policies  which  has been  a major  determinant  of market  structure  prior  to the 1980
reforms. Development  plans  in effect  shaped  regulatory  policies  of successive  governments'  and they  became
more  conservative  over  time -reinforcing  the  larger  role assigned  to the plans  by restricting  entry  which  in
turn made  State  control  of financial  resources  easier. A common  theme  running  in all  the three  plans  Turkey
implemented  during  the aforementioned  period  was  that the  country  had enough  commercial  banks and  that
the smaller  banks in the sector  should  be merged  to reduce  overheads  so that stronger  institutions  could  be
created  (Akguc  1987). Given  this line  of reasoning,  the  plans argued  that the  need  and benefits  for new
commercial  banks  should  be clearly  demonstrated  if they  were  to be established  at all. Instead,  the plans
argued  for the establishment  of development  and specialized  service  banks,  mostly  to support  industry. 6 In
line  with the  recommendations  of the  plan the government  pennitted  the establishment  of 4 new  development
and  specialized  banks  between  1962-75  period  which  were  not authorized  to collect  deposits. During  the
1962-80  period  only  3 new  commercial  banks  were  established  which  demonstrate  the  existence  of strong
regulatory  entry  bariers. On the  other  hand, as noted  before  23 banks  were  either  liquidated  or merged
during  the 1960-80  period  which  reduced  the number  of banks  to 43 by 1980  from 59 at the end  of 1959.
Another  characteristic  of the 1963-80  period,  particularly  after  early 1970s, has been  the emergence
of private  banks  owned  by industrial  groups  which  Akguc  (1987)  refers  as the  beginning  of holding  banking.
The  reasons  for this are straightforward.  During  the 1963  -1974  period  Turkey  followed  a strongly  growth
oriented  strategy  led  by both  public  and  private  sector  investments,  mostly  in import  competing  sectors,
infrastructure,  and  heavy  industries.  The  public  sector  investments  were  financed  by monetizing  budget
deficits,  issuing  low  yield  bonds  mostly  purchased  by public  pension  funds  and  bank deposits. At the same
time, after  the mid 1960s  and during  the 1970s,  the  private  sector,  encouraged  and supported  by the
6See the discussion  of banking and finance policy in 5 yearly plans in Akguc (1987) pp. 48-58.8
government  through  high  protection  rates  and a complicated  incentive  scheme  for investments,  was also
expanding  through  a holding  company  structure  and  was  in need  of financing.  While  the government  had
access  to capital  for its large  investments,  the  private  sector  did  not. In the  absence  of capital  markets  they
had to rely  on bank loans  to finance  their  investments  (Fry 1988). Since  the public  banks  were  primarily
financing  public  investments,  the  private  sector  had all the  incentives  to establish  or acquire  banks  to finance
their  investments.  Consequently,  with  restricted  entry,  major  groups  began  to acquire  banks  established
earlier  and  by the early  1970s  alnost all major  private  banks  belonged  to holding  groups  (Akguc  1987).
The  period  between  1963-80  also saw  a rapid  expansion  of branches  of banks  already  in the system.
Under  interest  rate controls,  the only  mode  of competition  to collect  deposits  was  non-price  competition  in the
form of establishing  branch  network  throughout  the country.  Rising  inflation  during  the late 1960s  and
throughout  the 1970s  also  provided  another  strong  incentive  banks  to expand  their  branch  networks.  With
interest  rates  becoming  increasingly  negative  in real  terms,  opening  new  branches  to collect  deposits  and
investing  them  into  real assets  was highly  profitable.  In fact,  as deposit  rates  became  increasingly  negative  in
real terms,  the number  of branches  of both public  and  private  banks  increased.  However,  it must  be noted
that as long  as deposit  rates  were  controlled  by the Government  and  inflation  was  rising,  this made  sense  and
was  consistent  with  profit  maximization.'  Due  to these  factors  the  number  of branches  jumped  to 5769  in
1980  from 1720  in 1960  despite  the  fact that there  was a significant  reduction  in the number  of banks. The
important  thing  to note about  this process  is that it resulted  in excessive  investment  in bank branches  and
contributed  to bank sizes  that are  larger  than  they  would  be if the price  of capital  was  not distorted.  At the
same  it significantly  contributed  to concentration  in the sector  since  there  was  very  little entry  which  meant
that the  expanding  banks  were  the  same  old ones.
As long as the marginal cost of deposits,  equal to the interest rate on deposits plus the cost of buildings and equipment was
less than the inflation rate banks would expand their network to collect  deposits. Hence, as the spread between the deposits rates and
the inflation rate widened profit maximization  would require more investment into bank branches, which is actually  what happened in
Turkey.9
Cumulatively,  the combination  of mutually  reinforcing  financially  and  regulatory  restrictive  policies,
coupled  with the  exit of 23 banks  over  the 1960-1980  have  led  to highly  concentrated  market  structure,  and
an overbranched,  inefficient  banking  system. By 1980,  the top 5 banks  controlled  about  70 percent  of
deposits,  64 percent  of assets  and  owned  60 percent  of all  branches,  as well  as controlled  more  than  10
percent  of the  number  of deposit  accounts  (see  table 1). Overhead  costs in the sector  reached  to atound  7
percent  of total assets,  almost  triple  the OECD  average  by 1980. Hence,  although  the developnit  strategy
and  its related  financially  and regulatory  restrictive  policies  contributed  to the industrialization  of Turkey,
they  may  have  introduced  distortions  that are difficult  to eliminate  with  respect  to the systems'  efficiency  and
competitiveness.  Fry (1979)  for example  noted  that even  if all interest  rate  restrictions  were  abolished,  " a
minimum  deposit  rate  might  be needed  to force  Turkey's  cartelized  and  oligopolistic  banking  system  to
achieve  the competitive  ideal  solution".10
11. FINANCIAL REFORMS
Im. 1. Financial Liberalization
In June 1980, simultaneously  with the structural adjustment and broad liberalization  policies that put
an end to the import substitution era, the Government  launched financial  reforms. 8 The goal was to develop a
competitive  and efficient  financial system that would  support a more liberal economy. This was to be
achieved  through deregulation  and promoting entry into the system. Reforms eliminated interest rate
restrictions on deposits and loans, and eased entry into the market and permitted new types of financial
instruments and institutions. The initial phase of deregulation  saw sharp increases in interest rates and
attempts by the larger banks to hold them low through the so-called "gentlemen's  agreement" which in
essence  was open collusion. However,  this proved unsustainable. Faced with higher rates offered by the
unregulated brokerage houses, larger banks increased  their rates which resulted in fierce competition and
extremely  high real interest rates.  This situation, combined  with financial  distress in real sectors led to the
collapse of six banks during 1983 and 1984. These developments  in turn has led to partial reversal of
reforms and the Central Bank began to reregulate deposit interest rates, though at much higher levels relative
to pre-1980 situation. However, as much as this was to restore financial stability it was also a measure to
deal with collusive  practices of banks.
The Central Bank continued with the regulation  of deposit rates until 1988 occasionally  adjusting
them to maintain  positive real rates of return.  In late 1988, deposit rates were again liberalized and this
policy  was maintained  since then although there were a number of temporary interventions. Therefore, the
8For  a more  detailed  review  of financial  liberalization  experience  of Turkey,  see OECD  (1988),  Onis  and
Ozmucur  (1988),  Akyuz  (1990),  Atiyas  (1990),  Akkurt  et.al  (1992),  and  Atiyas  and  Ersel  (1994).11
switch  to price  competition  was  not complete  until  late 1988  although  the  reform  process  started  in 1980.
Nevertheless,  despite  occasional  setbacks,  higher  levels  of interest  rates  resulted  in substantial  growth  of the
financial  system  and contibuted  to financial  deepening.  By  the end  of 1990,  the stock  of financial  assets
reached  47.7  percent  of GDP  from  around  28 percent  in 1980  while  the M2/GDP  ratio  rose  to 25.6  percent
from  about  21 percent  in 1980  (table  2). In line  with  financial  liberalization  policies,  most directed  credit
programs  and  preferential  rates  were  eliminated  contributing  to more  efficient  allocation  of resources  during
the past decade. Although  reserve  requirements  were  lowered,  liquidity  ratios  were  increased  which  in turn
put a wedge  between  deposit  and loan  rates.
1.2.  Changes  in Market  Structure  and Performance  of Commercial  Banks
Reforms  were  successful  in attracting  entry  into  the  banking  system,  one of the  key objectives.  As a
result  of easing  of entry  restrictions,  the number  of banks  increased  from 43 to 66 between  1980-90.  Out of
the 43 banks  in 1980,  8 banks  were  either  liquidated  or merged  with  other  institutions  Hence,  there  were  31
de novo  entries  into  the system,  of which  19  were  foreign  and 11  national  during  the 1980-90  period.
However,  almost  all of the new  entrants  specialized  in trade  finance  and  wholesale  corporate  banking.  None
of the new  banks,  foreign  and Turkish,  established  offices  beyond  the  three  largest  cities,  and  by and large
they  eschewed  the  retail  banking  market  despite  the  fact that there  are  no restrictions  on the scope  of their
operations.  At the end of 1990,  they  accounted  for less than  half of 1 percent  of savings  and commercial
deposits. Hence,  the new  financial  institutions  filled  certain  profitable  niches  which  in itself  is a positive
development.  Their  impact  on the  retail  banking  market  level,  however,  have  been  quite  limited.
Nevertheless,  as pointed  out by Akkurt  et al. (1992),  the entry  of new  banks,  particularly  the foreign  ones,  has
been  instumental  in improving  the quality  of human  capital  and financial  technology  of the sector.12
As expected,  reforms  reduced  concentration  in the sector. Table 1 presents  3, 5, 8, and 10  firm
concentration  ratios  in terms  of deposits,  savings  deposits,  loans,  assets,  and number  of savings  accounts.
The  declines  were  most  pronounced  in the 3 and 5 firm  concentration  ratios. This  result  has been  mainly  due
to the top 5 banks,  except  one, losing  their  market  shares,  especially  in total deposits. In fact, with  the
exception  of the  largest  bank (Ziraat  Bank),  banks  who  ranked  among  the top 3 and 5 in deposits  in 1980  all
saw  their  market  shares  decline  in varying  magnitudes.  The  decline  in share  of second  largest  bank in total
deposits  has been  particularly  significant  as its share  fell  from 20 percent  in 1980  to around  12  percent  in at
the end of 1991. While  the  top 3 and 5 banks  have  lost market  shares  the second  tier banks  that existed
before  the 1980  reforms  have  increased  theirs. It appears  that  they  were  the ones  who  benefited  from
dorequlation  of interest  rates  to increase  their  market  shares  and  probably  came  closer  to their  optimal  scale  in
tern's of their operations.
While  the quantitative  declines  in some  measures  of concentration  have  been  large  it has been  small
in pome  others  considering  the number  of entries. For example,  the 3 firm  concentration  ratio in terms  of
t9tat deposits  declined  from  53 percent  in 1980  to 40 percent  in 1990  while  the 5 firm  concentration  ratio  fell
from  09 percent  to 55 percent,  also in the same  period. However,  when  8 and 10  firm  concentration  ratios  are
analyzed  the  declines  are  much  less  pronounced.  The  top 10  banks accounted  for 88 percent  of total deposits
in 19$Q  and 82 percent  in 1990,  a decline  of 6 percentage  points compared  to a decline  of 13  percentage
poits  in the 3 firm  concentration  ratio. Likewise,  10  firm  asset and  loan  concentration  ratios  registered
sma,ler  declines  as shown  in table 1. This  indicates  that while  there  were  changes  in the market  shares  of
banks  following  the  reforms  reflecting  some  interbank  rivalry,  these  have  been  mostly  among  the  top 10 or
top 15  banks  which  were  in the system  before  the 1980  refonns. This  may  suggest  that a critical  number  of
brapches  is needed  to be an effective  competitor  in the retail  banking  market.13
Savings  deposits  are  particularly  important  for  the analysis  of competition  in retail  banking  since  it is
one of the main  outputs  of retail  banks  and  it is the  most basic  financial  asset people  hold. 9 At the  end of
1991,  of the 45.6  million  bank accounts  in Turkey,  36.7  million  were  savings  accounts  representing  for more
than  half  of the  volume  of total deposits  in the system. During  the first half  of 1980s,  there  was a marked
increase  in concentration  ratios  for savings  deposits  as shown  in table I and  by 1986, the 3 firm
concentration  ratio  reached  to 63 percent  and 10  firm  concentration  ratio  reached  to 92 percent. The  process
was  reversed  in 1987  and at the end of 1991,  3 and 10 firm  concentration  ratios  stood at 42 percent  and 83
percent  respectively.  As before,  the decline  in the  magnitude  of the 10  firm  concentration  ratio  for savings
deposits  was  less than  the  decline  in the 3 or 5 firm  concentration  ratio.
Another  interesting  statistic  to evaluate  is the number  of savings  accounts.  During  the 1980-91
period,  the number  of savings  accounts  increased  from  26 million  to 36.7 million.  At the same  time  there  was
a marked  increase  in the number  of accounts  opened  with  the  large  banks. As shown  in table 1, the  3 firm
concentration  ratio  of number  of accounts  increased  from  55 percent  in 1980  to 62 percent  in 1991  while  the
10 firm  concentration  ratio  increased  from  89 percent  to 94 percent,  in the same  period. While  in volume
terms  the percentage  of savings  deposits  placed  with  the  leading  banks declined  as explained  above,  the
increase  in the  number  of deposit  accounts  by the large  banks  probably  implies  that large  banks  attracted
mostly  small  depositors  while  the sophisticated  depositors  moved  their  funds  to other  banks  or to exploit
other  profitable  investments.  This  would  however,  suggest  that the power  of top 10  banks  did not decrease
with  respect  to the most  basic  item  of retail  banking,  small  savings  accounts.
9Although  there  is disagreement  over  what  banks  produce,  it seems  reasonable  and  technically  acceptable  to
viewmajor  deposit  and  loan  categories  as bank  outputs. See  Berger  and  Humprey  (1992b).14
Performance  of the  banking  sector  in terms  of profitability  following  the  reforms  have  improved
despite  declining  concentration  ratios and  new  entry. As shown  in table  3, and pointed  out by Atiyas  and
Ersel  (1994)  profits  in the banking  sector  increased  substantially,  particularly  after  the  mid 1980s,  and
reached  to levels  about  5 times  the OECD  average  by the  end of 1990. At the same  time, the  declining  trend
in operating  costs  following  the initial  reform  years  were  reversed  in 1988  and since  then  these  rose sharply
and  reached  to more  than  double  the OECD  average  (see  table 3). This  would  imply  that deregulation  has not
yet led  to rationalization  of the use of capital  and labor  and  hence  to improvements  in productive  efficiency  as
expected.  The  ability  of  banks to increase  and maintain  high  profit  rates  under  these  circumstances  would
seem  to suggest  that the source  of profits  was  market  power  or some  other  market  imperfection  rather  than
productive  efficiency.  Furthermore,  as pointed  out by Rhoades  (1993)  it would  also  mean  that additional
resources  are  not entering  the  market,  implying  the existence  of non-regulatory  entry  barriers.
IV. METHODOLOGICAL  APPROACH
The  review  of developments  in the banking  system  suggests  that market  structure  continues  to have  a
significant  impact  on the  conduct  and performance  of banks,  and implicitly  on competition.  However,
observations  by themselves  are  not sufficient  to establish  a causal  link  between  these  parameters,  which
requires  an empirical  investigation.  In order  to do this, this study  presents  and tests a number  of hypotheses
by drawing  upon  the  methods  of industrial  organization.  The  analysis  is in two  parts. The  first part attempts
to determine  if there  is a relationship  between  market  structure  and performance  of banks  using  the structure-
conduct-performance  (SCP)  paradigm  as a framework  of analysis. The  study  examines  the two  main
hypotheses,  namely  the "traditional"  and "efficient  structure"  hypotheses  found  in the general  literature  for the
explanation  of market  structure-performance  relationship.  The  second  part focuses  more  directly  on15
competition  in the retail  banking  market. In particular,  it analyzes  the impact  of new  bank  entry  and sunk
investments  in the system  that resulted  from  pre-1980  interest  rate and regulatory  policies  on competition.
IV.  1. Market  Structure
The  first hypothesis  tested  in this paper,  the traditional  SCP idea,  emphasizes  the market  or industry
structure  when  analyzing  the  pricing  and output  decisions  of market  participants.  In this context,  market
structure  refers  to the number  and size  distribution  of firms. The  market  is treated  as the  unit of analysis.  If
it is concentrated,  say  in assets,  sales,  deposits  or some  other  measure  of economic  activity,  then  we are likely
to observe  non-competitive,  collusive  behavior  and,  in that case,  equilibrium  industry  profitability  will
depend  upon  the degree  and stability  of collusion  among  firms. Therefore,  the higher  the share  of the market
controlled  by a small  number  of large  firms,  or the  higher  the  market  concentration,  the greater  the  possibility
that market  participants  will  agree  to collude,  either  tacitly  or overtly,  and raise  prices  above  costs,  therefore
earning  supranormal  profits. Hence,  the existence  of a positive  relationship  between  some  measure  of
concentration,  proxying  market  structure,  and  profits,  proxying  performance,  would  imply  that market
structure  is not competitive  and  market  participants  enjoy  profits  primarily  because  of their  market  power.
The  second  and more  recent  hypothesis  is known  as the efficient  structure  hypothesis.  It maintains
that firm-specific  efficiencies  arising  from superior  management,  use of new  technology,  etc.,  enable  some
firms  to increase  their  market  share  at the expense  of other  relatively  inefficient  firms,  leading  to market
concentration.  The  implicit  assumption  is that the  differing  efficiencies  among  firms  lead  to unequal  market
shares  and  high levels  of concentration,  and are  causally  due to factors  that reduce  costs. The  leading  firms
will  earn  above-average  profits even  if they  charge  prices  at the level  of secondary  firms. Therefore,  we
observe  a positive  relationship  between  market  concentration  and  profits,  but it is not due  to collusion  and16
does  not necessarily  imply  a causation  between  structure  and  performance.  The  efficient  structure  hypothesis
implies  that the  causal  link  will  be between  market  share,  a measure  of frm efficiency,  and  profits,  but there
will  be no causal  relationship  between  market  concentration  and  profitability.  Therefore,  the positive
relationship  between  concentration  and  profits  found  in some  industry  studies  is spurious  and simply  reflects
the correlation  between  market  share  and concentration.
It is worthwhile  noting  that both hypotheses  point  to an observationally  equivalent  relationship
between  market  structure  and  profits  while  differing  as to the causal  factors  generating  it. While  it is possible
that both hypotheses  might  be operative  simultaneously  it is nevertheless  important  to distinguish  between
the two as they  have  different  public  policy  implications.  If profitability  is due to market  structure,  then a
regulatory  policy  to reduce  concentration  and consolidation  in the sector  may  be  justified. On  the other  hand
if performance  is due  to efficiency  then  such  a regulatory  policy  may  be welfare  reducing.  Weiss  (1974)
suggested  that by estimating  a profit  function  that  takes  both market  share  and concentration  measure  into
account  at the same  time it may  be possible  to ascertain  whether  profitability  is due  to the efficiency  of or to
market  structure,  and hence  the  validity  of the two  hypotheses,  in explaining  the structure-performance
relationship.  Tests  ofthis nature  havebeenundertakenby  Smirlock  (1985)  and  Evanoffand  Fortier  (1988),
Molyneaux  (1992)  and it is the approach  adopted  in this study.'°
'°There is a considerable  disagreenent in the literature as to which of the two hypotheses best explain the correlation
between market concentration  and profits. For a review of the literature see Evanoff and Fortier (1988), and Berger (1993).  Most
recent studies, Berger andHannan (1989), Neuberger and Zimmerman (1991), Saunders and Udell (1991), Hannan (1991), and
Neumark and Sharpe (1992) use deposit rates or loan rates instead of profits as the dependent variable  and provide a much more direct
test of the SCP hypothesis in a manner that excludes as an alternative explanation  the form of efficient structure hypothesis that is
used to explain the positive relationship between profits and concentration. The weight of the evidence these studies  provide support
the SPC hypothesis.17
IV.2. Entry  and Competition
A number  of earlier  studies,  Heggestad  and  Rhoades  (1976), Rhoades  (1980),  and  Rhoades  and
Rutz (1981),  and  Bodenhorn  (1990),  studied  competition  in banking  markets  in the USA  by analyzing  the
degree  of stability  in interfirm  relationships.  Their  approach  proxies  interfirm  rivalry,  or competition,  among
finns by mobility  and  turnover  and analyzes  the impact  of a number  of important  variables  that are  expected
to influence  competition,  such  as entry,  and size  of the  pre-existing  firms. In this context,  mobility  indicates
churning  about  the  rank  position  of leading  firms. Turnover,  on  the other  hand captures  the  movement  into
the  leading  bank  group  by banks  formerly  outside  of that  group,  reflecting  aggressive  behavior.  It is also
thought  that such  measures  reflect  a certain  market  structure.  In other  words,  changes  in the  rank and
possibly  output  shares  of firms  in the  market  do not result  in certain  kind  of conduct  (competitive  or
uncompetitive)  but rather  they  reflect  conduct  that arises  from  certain  market  structure;  in uncompetitive
markets  successful  cooperation  (coliusion)  among  fimns  will  not lead  to changes  in firm  rankings  or in market
shares. However,  in competitive  markets  the opposite  is expected  to be observed. This  study  follows  the
aforementioned  earlier  studies  in methodology  but modifies  them  slightly  to assess  the impact  of entry,  size  of
the leading  banks,  and  market  structure  on competition  in the banking  market  following  the  refoinms.18
V. MODEL  SPECIFICATIONS  AND  DATA
V.1. Market  Structure  Model
Earlier  studies  analyzing  the  relationship  between  market  structure  and profitability  used linear
regression  techniques,  regressing  some  measure  of profits  on a market  concentration  variable--proxying
market  structure--and  other  control  variables.  Following  Weiss  (1974)  and Smirlock  (1985), Evanoff  and
Fortier  (1988),  and Molyneaux  (1992),  a cross-sectional  profit  equation  including  both  firm-  specific  market
share,  proxying  for firm  efficiency,  and  concentration  variables  is specified:
ROA.  =  b + bICR, + b2MSj,  + b3CA. + b4TA. + bsLA.
+ b7DT. + b8OEAi,  + bgMDGRt  +bjoDI  (1)
where:
ROA  =  bank i's profits  measured  as the  return  on assets
CR  =  market  structure  variable,  5 (10)  firm  deposit  (asset)
concentration  ratio
MS  =  market  share  measure,  bank  i's deposits  as a
percentage  of total  market  deposits
CA  =  bank i's capital-to-asset  ratio
TA  =  bank i's total assets
LA  = bank i's loans-to-assets  ratio
DT  =  bank  i's demand  deposits-to-total  deposits  ratio19
OEA  bank  i's operating  expenses-to-total  assets  ratio
MDGR =  market  deposits  growth  rate
D1  = 1 for private,  0 for public  banks
A finding  of b,>O  and  b2=O  supports  the  traditional  S-C-P  hypothesis.  On the other  hand,  if b1=0  and
b>0,  then  the efficient  structure  is supported.  It is, of course,  possible  that  both b, and b 2 maybe  positive  and
significant,  indicating  that both  factors  are operative  simultaneously.  The  effects  of market  concentration  and
market  share  on profits  will  be given  by partial  derivatives  equal  to the coefficients  b, and b 2 respectively.
The  performance  measure,  the dependent  variable,  is bank  profits  measured  as the  return  on assets
(ROA),  i.e.,  net income  divided  by total assets. Other  possible  performance  measures  are  return  on equity
(ROE)  and  bank stock  prices. The  use of ROE  may  not be the best measure  because  banks  can  divide  capital
between  debt  and  equity,  making  the comparison  of equity  values  across  banks  difficult.  The  banks  in
Turkey  are closely-held  by various  industrial  groups,  individuals,  and  the government,  and their  stocks  are  not
traded. Hence,  we are  unable  to observe  and  use bank stock  prices. ROA  is the  most widely  used  bank
performance  measure  and,  as suggested  by Evanoff  and Fortier  (1988),  dividing  net income  by total assets,
which  is ROA,  makes  it a more  comparable  measure  across  banks  because  "bank  assets  are  a more  common
denomination."  Therefore,  ROA  is the dependent  variable."
The  independent  variables  include  both firm  and market  specific  variables,  and  they  are  similar  to
those  utilized  in previous  studies. Following  previous  studies,  we proxy  market  structure,  with the  share  of 5
leading  banks  in total deposits. Hence,  concentration  ratio is defined  as the sum  of shares  of the leading  5
" 1Business Week (April 9, 1984), p. 83, and Business Week (April 8, 1985), p. 106, also suggest that ROA is
the single best performance measure for banks, as cited in Rhoades (I987).20
banks  in total deposits,  CR5. 12 It must  be noted,  though,  that what  constitutes  an appropriate  market
structure  measure  is not easy  to answer. Theory  provides  little  guide  on the selection  of an appropriate
market  structure  variable.' 3 As noted  by Evanoff  and  Fortier  (1988), "the  theory  offers  no information  on
the absolute  number  or size  distribution  of fnns necessary  to exercise  market  power. The questions
concemning  what number  of firms  is too large  to permit  collusion,  and what  amount  of output  control  for price
setting,  are empirical  issues." However,  theory  suggests  that there  is a relationship  between  the level  of
output  controlled  by a small  number  of large  firms,  and  performance,  and probably  because  of this reason  an
overwhelming  number  of researchers  have  used  concentration  ratio  despite  its limitations. 1 4
Tlh market  share  (MS)  variable  is assumed  to be a proxy  for finn-specific  effects,  and is defined  as
bank deposits  divided  by total market  deposits. There  are  also a number  of control  variables  similar  to those
that can be found  in earlier  SCP studies. They  are  included  in order  to take into  account  factors  like  risk,
costs  and demand  that influence  profitability.  Given  the fact  that ROA is not risk adjusted,  a capital-asset
ratio (CA)  is included  to account  for the  unequal  risk levels  between  banks,  with  low  ratios  indicating
relatively  risky  positions. Banks  with  low  capital  ratios  may  be more  aggressive  and  take  risks expecting
'2This study differs in one important respect from the other studies in that the 5 bank concentration  ratio is for the entire
retail banking mIarket  in Turkey while others use concentration  ratios for local banking markets. In that sense, the study is not
conventional. However, theoretical  models establishing  a relationship  between market concentration  and profits does not specify  local
market concentration  as the appropriate  variable,  Hannan (1991).
Second, in the data used in this study, the concentration  variable  changes from quarter to quarter and it is not constant and hence does
not create problems for estimating the equations. Third, the fact that banks at various times entered into gentlemen's agreements
would  strongly  suggest  that  some  measure  of market  structure  be utilized  in assessing  the performnance  of banks.
"See Rhoades (1993) for a discussion on the appropriateness  of the CR and HEi.
"4 Alternatively,  some researchers have used the Herfindahl-Hirschmann  index (El,  but the use of HHI in place of CR3
does not change any empirical  results. HEH  is also criticized on the grounds that it is mainly concerned with the dispersion  of sellers,
but the theory is more concerned with concentration  and therefore a concentration measure should be used. For all the above reasons
the various  CR measures  in  terms  of  deposits are is used as a market structure proxy. See Rhoades (1993) for a recent discussion  of
the
issue.21
high  returns. On  the other  hand,  highly  capitalized  banks  might  play  it safe and  hold less  risky  assets  (loans)
and remain  profitable.  Therefore,  the expected  sign  of CA  is indeterminate.
Another  control  vanable  coming  from  the  liability  side  of the  balance  sheet  is the amount  of demand
deposits  relative  to total deposits  (DT). This  ratio gives  a bank's  relative  cost of funds  and  should  be
positively  related  to profitability  given  the fact  that demand  deposits  are  relatively  cheap  source  of funds. If
this ratio is high,  then  banks  do not need  to make  use of purchased  funds,  which  are  expensive.  From  the
asset side  of the  balance  sheet  we  have  the  ratio  of total loans  to total assets  (LA). This  ratio is of particular
interest  because  loans  usually  represent  the  major  category  of income  earning  asset,  generating  more  income
than  the  main alternative  assets,  government  securities,  in addition  to providing  some  idea about  bank's  risks.
A high  ratio may  reflect  aggressive  loan  marketing  which  could  increase  profits. On  the other  hand,  large
loan  portfolios  may  be costly  to manage  and  could  result  in substantial  loan  losses,  which  decrease  profits.
Therefore,  the coefficient  on this portfolio  variable  could  be positive  or negative.
In order  to control  for bank size,  total assets  (TA)  of each  bank  is included  in the sample. In this way
the  possibility  of scale  economies  that could  arise  from size,  and  the  possibility  that larger  banks  have  greater
loan  and  product  diversification  potential  is taken  into  account.  As pointed  out by Smirlock  (1983)  and
Evanoff  and  Fortier  (1988),  diversification  reduces  risks and  therefore  the  required  rate of return. Hence,  the
sign  on this coefficient  is indeterminant.  Operating  expenses  (OEA)  should  exert  a negative  impact  on bank
profits and  it is included  in the analysis  as a proportion  of total assets. We account  for market  demand  by
including  the  market  deposits  growth  rate (MDGR).  Markets  with  high  growth  rates  are  likely  to increase
bank's  deposit  base but the  contribution  of deposits  to profits  will  depend  upon  a number  of factors. First,  it
will  depend  on the bank's  ability  to convert  deposit  liabilities  into  income  earning  assets,  which  are  related  to
macroeconomic  factors  such as the GNP  growth  rate,  the level  of interest  rates,  etc. In addition,  high growth22
rates attract  additional  competitors  who  reduce  profits  for all  market  participants.  Therefore,  the sign  of
MDGR  is also indeterminant.  In order  to account  for different  types  of ownership  a dummy  variable  is
included.  DI equals  one for  private  banks and 0 for public  banks.
V.2. Competition  Model
Following  Rhoades  (1980),  and  Bodenhom  (1990)  the following  model  is estimated:
P=  bo  + b1ENT, + b2AVGt  + b3MDGR,  + b4CR5,
where:
R  = rivahy
R  = mobility  among top 1O  banks
R2  =  mobility  among  all  banks
ENT = number of entries
CR  = 5 firm  deposit  concentration  ratio
AVG = average  fixed  asset  size  of top 10 banks
MDGR  = market  deposit  growth  rate
The  dependent  variable  in the analysis  takes  two  forms  and  takes  into  account  both the price  and
non-price  dimensions  of competition.  However,  it is slightly  different  than  the earlier  studies  which  proxy
competition  by mobility  and turnover  among  the top three  and five  firms. The  first mobility  measure  used  in
this study,  on the other  hand,  focuses  on top 10  banks  in terms  of deposits  because  of their similarity  to each
other. They  operate  large  branchnetworks  nationwide  and hence  they  may  be expected  to display  similar
operational  characteristics.  The  reason  for focusing  on the leading  firms  is methodological.  As pointed  outby Heggestad  and  Rhoades  (1976),  size  differences  between  firms  among  the leading  fimns  is often
significant  but differences  among  firms,  both in relative  and absolute  terms,  is observed  to decline  rapidly
once  one moves  down  in size  from  industry  leaders. Hence,  a rank change  among  industry  leaders  is probably
due  to some  significant  event  that influence  structural  interfrm  relationships  while  rank changes  among
smaller  fimns  is more  likely  to be due  to chance  or to another  factor  that unrelated  to structural  characteristics
of the market. Another  important  reason  is that leading  firms  in a given  industry  are  well  known  names  and
have  capacity  in terms  of their size  and establishness  to enforce  desired  strategies  which  inturn  may  create  a
pattern  of conduct  for the entire  market. For  these  reasons,  the first mobility  measure  is defined  as the sum  of
rank changes  among  the top 10 banks  for each  of the quarters  during  the 1986-1992  period.
While  the  first measure  is designed  to capture  structural  changes  in interfirm  rivahy,  its focus  on the
leaders  may  not capture  the aggressive  behavior  of fringe  firms. Earlier  studies  attempted  to overcome  this
problem  by the turnover  measure  which  accounts  for the  changes  in the  identity  of leading  firms. In other
words,  turnover  measures  the  number  of times  firms  below  the  top 5 or top 10  move  into  the ranks  of top 5 or
top 10. However,  in the Turkish  context  turnover  measure  may  not be appropriate  and is not used  in this
study. The size  differences  between  the leading  and fringe  firms are  too large  in Turkey  for fringe  firms  to
make  into  the  leading  group,  and only  counting  the  number  of times  the smaller  banks  move  into  the leading
group  of banks  competition  at the  level  of fringe  firms  may  be understated.  Hence,  the second  mobility
measure  takes  into account  the  rank changes  for all  banks  in the  market. It is defined  as the sum  of rank
changes  for all banks  for each  of the quarters  during  the 1989-1992  period.
Among  the  independent  variables  in this study,  the entry  variable  is of particular  interest. Since  the
financial  reforms  aimed  at increasing  competition  by promoting  entry  and  this analysis  is concerned  with the
impact  of entry  on competition,  entry  measure  is proxied  by the number  of gross bank  entry  into  the system24
during  the 1986-1992  period. However,  considering  the fact  that most entries  into  the system  took  place
during  the first part of the 1980s,  and  that 4 year  time  period  may  be relatively  short  time for new  entrants,
mostly  on a small  scale  as discussed  already,  to have  an impact  on  market  rivalry,  this variable  is lagged  up to
5 years. This  variable  is expected  to have  a positive  sign  since  it increases  the  number  of banks  in the  market
which  should  alter  the  competitive  stance  of existing  banks  toward  their  rivals. As pointed  out  by Rhoades
(1980)  entry  will  reduce  concentration  and  " will  tend  to increase  uncertainty  among  the firms  in the  market
with  respect  to their  views  of the actions  of their  rivals as well  as to their views  of the action  of the  new
entrant". Hence,  entry  is expected  to weaken  the established  relationships  among  old firms  and contribute  to
competition.
Competitive  structure  of the market  is captured  by a concentration  variable. As noted  already  this
variable  is expected  to influence  the  conduct  of market  participants  by making  cooperation  among  market
participants  easier  which  in turn would  keep  firm  rankings  stable. As pointed  out by Heggestad  and Rhoades
(1976)  such  stability  may  also be due  to " vigorous  but stalemated  competition,  as all competitors  strain  and
succeed  equally".  However,  such  a an outcome  would  be improbable  in the sense  that not all competitors
would  perform  equally  well  at all  times. Hence,  the greater  the stability  which  is expected  to be facilitated  by
concentration,  the higher  the chances  that overt  or tacit  cooperation  exists. Consequently,  this variable  is
expected  to exert  a negative  influence  on interfirm  rivalry.
Two  other  independent  variables  are  included  to take  into account  other  market  factors  expected  to
influence  competition.  The  average  fixed  asset  size  of ten largest  banks  which  is mostly  made  from  their
branches  and  equipment  is introduced  to capture  the  possibility  that large  firms  are  perceived  as intimidating
to other  rivals  or potential  entrants. It proxies  investments  made  in fixed  assets  and should  be a good
measure  in determining  the  impact  of such  sunk  investments  on competition.  Size  may also  have  an25
important  reputation  component.  However,  under  either  case,  this variable  should  negatively  affect  mobility.
Finally,  a market  growth  variable  is included  for  two reasons. First,  growing  markets  makes  entry  more
attractive  and easier. Second,  rapid  growth  should  increase  uncertainty  in interfirm  relationships  and  makes
tacit and/or  overt  cooperation  more  difficult  and  hence  should  increase  mobility.  It is defined  as the quarterly
growth  rate of deposits  over  the 1986-1992  (1st quarter)  period.
V.3. Data
The data  used  in this study  is the Central  Banks General  Directorate  of Banking  and  covers  the
period  between  1986  (I) and 1992  (I) and includes  all deposit  money  banks. The  sample  contains  ratios and a
number  of levels  of variables  from income  statements  and  balance  sheets  with 1302  observations.  For the
analysis,  the data  has been  pooled  (cross-section  and  time series).26
VI. EMPIRICAL  RESULTS
VI.1.  Market  Structure  Equations
Regression  results  for the  market  structure  model  are  reported  in tables  4, 5, and 6. All of the
equations  are  estimated  using-OLS. 15 The  presence  of heteroskedasticity  was  tested  by the White  (1980)  test
and  the results  indicated  the.absence  of such  problem  in the  data set. In general,  the explanatory  power  of the
regressions  are  good,  given  the cross-sectional  nature  of the sample. Three  equations  are estimated.  The  first
equation  as reported  in table 4 tests the  traditional  SCP  hypothesis.  This  is performed  by estimating  equation
(1) without  the  market  share  (MS)  variable,  but with  the  market  structure  measure  CR5. The  coefficient  on
the market  structure  variable  is of particular  interest. As table 4 shows,  the results  support  the  hypothesis
that market  structure  is related  to the rate of profits. The  coefficient  on the  market  structure  variable  is
positive  and statistically  significant  at the 1%  level. Therefore,  using  an approach  found  in earlier  studies,  it
is found  that market  structure  is an important  factor  in explaining  bank profitability  in the Turkish  banking
market.
In the next step,  equation  (1)  is estimated  with  both market  share and  market  structure  variables. By
doing  so the validity  of the  two competing  hypothesis  in explaining  bank  profitability  is tested. According  to
the  efficient  structure  hypothesis  there  should  be a direct  relationship  between  market  share,  arising  from
firm-specific  efficiencies,  and profits. Therefore,  if bŽ>O  and  b,=0, then  it is possible  to infer  that bank
profitability  is directly  linked  to market  share,  proxying  efficiency,  and  banks  controlling  large  portions  of
" 5Since  the  data  is pooled,  equations  were  also  estimated  using  fixed  effects  (least  squares  dummy  variables)
and  random  effects  (variance  components)  techniques  and  there  were  no  change  in the  results.  They  are  available  from
the  author  upon  request.27
deposits  are  more  efficient  than others  and  earn  rents  due to their  efficiency.  Such  a finding  will  also imply
that  market  concentration  does  not enable  banks  to earn  supranormal  (monopoly)  profits. On  the other  hand,
if b 1>O  and  b2=O  will  mean,  as put nicely  by Smirlock  (1985),  "market  share  does  not affect  firm  rents and
that  rents  reflected  in higher  profitability  are  monopoly  rents that  result  from  market  concentration."
However,  as indicated  earlier,  the  results  might  yield  other  possible  combinations  of b 1 and  b2 and  both forces
can  be operative  simultaneously.  The  purpose  of this exercise  is to determine  the impact  of MS on CR5 and
profits. In Evanoff  and  Fortier  (1988)  and Smirlock  (1985),  the inclusion  of market  share  in their  initial
model,  with  the  market  structure  variable,  changes  the overall  relationship:  market  share  enters  with a strong
positive  influence  and  market  concentration  becomes  insignificant.  In this study,  however,  such  effect  is not
found  as results  presented  in table 5 show. They  do not support  the efficient  structure  hypothesis;  the
coefficient  of the  market  share  is not even  marginally  significant.  On  the other  hand,  the  market  structure
variable  is still significant  at the 1%  level  with a positive  sign.
The  possible  effect  of  market  share  on bank  profitability  was  tested  by estimating  equation  (1) with
the market  share  variable  and excluding  the market  structure  variable.  Both  hypotheses  interpret  market
share  variable  differently.  Researchers  who  support  the efficient  structure  hypothesis  would  argue  that a high
market  share  is an indication  of superior  efficiency.  On  the other  hand,  traditional  structure-performance
school  would  regard  market  share  as proxying  market  power,  due to product  differentiation  or some  other
factor,  which  will  give  leading  banks  the ability  to collude  and  thereby  earn  higher  than average  profits.
Table  6 shows  the results. The  coefficient  on the  market  share  variable  is positive  but is not significant.
Such  a finding  does  not support  the argument  that market  share  is a source  of power  by itself,  nor it supports
the  hypothesis  that firm-specific  effects  resulting  in high  market  shares  exist. This result  can  be interpreted
as additional  evidence  for the  validity  of SCP  hypothesis  for the Turkish  banking  market  since  the  market28
structure,  by itsel  is significant  as well  as with the  market  share  variable  while  the  market  share  is never  by
itself  nor with  the market  structure  variable.
The  robustness  of these  results  which  support  the SCP  hypothesis  is further  tested  by dropping  the
top 5 firms  from  the data  set and estimating  the same  equations  with  the same  concentration  ratio. This is
done  to determine  whether  some  influential  observations  are driving  the  results  and to assess  the influence  of
market  structure  on the  behavior  of smaller  (fringe)  firms  following  Demsetz  (1973). If both large  and small
firms  enjoy  profits,  then  collusion  is present  and the SCP  is supported.  If on the other  hand, leading  firms
achieve  rents,  the efficient  structure  hypothesis  cannot  be rejected  because  small  firms  do not benefit  from
concentration.
Tlhere  is another  aspect  of the possible  correlation  between  market  concentration  and fringe  firms'
profits. A positive  and significant  relationship  may  indicate  the existence  of a "collusive  price  leadership,"
Markham  (1951). HayandMorris  (1979)  note  thatinmarkets withrelatively  small  numbers  offirms and
slightly  differentiated  products  with similar  costs,  behavior  of the lending  or price-setting  firms  could  mirror
the conditions  facing  each  firm  and is likely  to be accepted  by other  finns. As pointed  out by Smirlock  and
Brown  (1986),  "the  collusion  lies  in their  acceptance  of the price  leader's  actions  so that all firms  can earn
monopoly  rents." Given  that  banking  markets  are  usually  made  up of a relatively  small  number  of firms
producing  only  slightly  differentiated  products,  they  may  be characterized  by collusive  price  leadership
(Smirlock  and Brown  1986). In this case,  secondary  bank  profits should  be correlated  with  market
concentration.  If there  is no collusion,  the coefficient  on CR5  should  not be greater  than  zero. If smaller
banks  are  profitable  because  of their  efficiency,  then  MS variable  must be positive  and  significant.  Finally,  to
determine  the  relative  importance  of MS and CR5  for smaller  banks,  both  variables  are  utilized  in the same
equation  simultaneously.  As before,  a finding  of CR5>0  and MS<O  would  indicate  the  presence  of collusive29
price  leadership  and support  the SCP  hypothesis.  On  the other  hand,  if CR5<0  and MS>O,  then  the  efficient
structure  hypothesis  cannot  be rejected.
The  results  are  presented  in tables  7, and 8. As before,  the market  structure  variable  by itself  is
highly  significant  and  its coefficient  is substantially  larger  than  before. This implies  that smaller  banks  also
benefit  from  concentration.  In fact,  these  findings  suggest  that they  benefit  more  than the  largest  banks.
Next  we estimate  the same  equation  with  the market  share. As table 7 shows,  MS is not significant  while
CR5  is significant  at the 1%  level. However,  the  magnitude  of MS increases  compared  to its magnitude  in
equation  in table 5. The  results  demonstrate  the  robustness  of our  findings  with  respect  to the  validity  of the
SCP  hypothesis,  and suggest  the  existence  of a collusive  price  leadership  type  of arrangement  in the Turkish
banking  market. This finding  also  indicates  that influential  observations  do not drive  the results.
Results  for control  variables  in the study  will  be summarized  briefly. The  coefficient  of the capital-
asset  ratio is highly  significant,  entering  with a positive  sign. It is probably  the case  that  well  capitalized
banks  behave  much  more  cautiously,  earn  relatively  low  returns,  but remain  profitable.  Results  with  the total
asset (size)  variable  are  somewhat  inconsistent.  In all but one equations  it has a positive  sign,  and it is always
insignificant.  However,  such  results  are  also found  in other  studies." 6 The  loan-asset  ratio is highly
significant  in all equations  and enters  with a negative  sign. This  indicates  that banks  with  large  loan
portfolios  relative  to assets  absorb  high administrative  costs  and incur  substantial  loan  losses. Relatively
cheaper  sources  of funds  as given  by the demand  deposits-total  deposits  ratio  (DT)  contribute  to profits  and
is statistically  significant  at the 5% level. Operating  expenses-total  asset  ratio is significant  in all  equations
" 6Shepherd  (1972),  finds  a negative  relationship  between  size  and  profitability  in his study  of the market  share-
rate of  return  relationship,  and  he attributes  this  to X inefficiency.  Newman,  et al (1979),  report  similar  results  in  their
analysis  of market  concentration-profitability  relationship  in Germany.  Like  Shepherd  (1972),  they  attribute  such  a
finding  to  X inefficiency.  More  recently,  Evanoff  and  Fortier  (1988)  find  a negative  relationship  between  size and
profitability  in their re-evaluation  of structure-performance  relationship.30
and  has the expected  sign,  which  is consistent  with  our expectations. Market  deposit  growth  rate (MDGR),
turned  out  to be insignificant  with a positive  sign  suggesting  that MDGR  does  not impact  profits .
significantly.  The  coefficient  for  the ownership  variable  is significant  suggesting  that privately  owned  banks
are  more  profitable  than the  public  banks.
VI.2.  Competition  Model  Equations
The competition  model  was estimated  by tobit  regression  on the pooled  cross  section  -time series
data  set. Table  9 presents  regression  results. Two  equations  are  estimated.  The  first one  uses  mobility
among  the  top 10  banks  while  the  second  uses  mobility  among  all banks  in the market  as the dependent
variable. In both equations,  most  variables  have  the expected  sign  and are  significant  at the 1 percent  level,
except  the  entry  variable. The  entry  variable,  in its lagged  and  unlagged  form,  enters  with a negative  sign  in
the first equation  and is not significant.  This is inconsistent  with our expectations  on  the basis of theory
although  similar  results  were  obtained  by Rhoades  (1980). When  mobility  among  all  firms is used  the sign  of
entry  variable  changes  but it still  remains  insignificant.  While  these  results  would  imply  that the entry  of
some  30 banks  during  the  last decade  or so did not have  a significant  procompetitive  effect  on rivalry  and
have  not been  sufficient  to alter  the  interfirm  relationships  among  banks in the  market,  they  may  be due to a
number  of reasons.
First,  it may  be that more  time is needed  before  the  new  entrants  can have  an impact  on market
relationships  and 5 year  lag  allowed  in the model  might  not be enough  to capture  the expected  adjustments  in
interfirm  relationships.  Second,  the entry  of new  banks  have  been  on a small  scale  which  reduces  the
likelihood  that  they  will  change  the  nature  of established  relationships.  In other  words,  a minimum  entry  size
may  be needed  in order  to penetrate  into  the  market  and compete  with  the  established  banks  effectively.31
Third,  as noted  before,  the new  entrants  chose  to focus  on trade  finance  and other  specialized  services
although  they are  authorized  to collect  deposits. This  in effect  left  the pre-existing  large  banks  unchallenged
in the  retail  market. Fourth,  as discussed  already  the decline  in concentration  ratios  have  been  primarily  due
to top 5 banks  losing  deposits  to the  ones  below  the top 5 which  were  in the system  prior to 1980  and they
already  had  reasonably  large  branch  networks  although  the magnitude  of their  losses  have  not been  sufficient
to alter  the  rankings. Given  these  considerations,  it is not surprising  that entry  did  not positively  influence
competition  in the equations  estimated.  Hence,  results  obtained  does  not mean  entry  does  not matter. Rather,
it highlights  the  importance  of conditions  under  which  entry  will  be more  effective,  i.e., when  the  type  and
size  of the  entrants  are close  to the  existing  firms  in the industry,  Hannah  and  Kay (1977),  Kheamani  and
Shapiro  (1988).
The  results  for the  concentration  variable  are consistent  with  expectations  -market  concentration  is a
ddeterminant  of competition  in the retail  banking  market  and  is correlated  with a low level  of interfirm  rivalry.
Such  a finding  is in line  with  Heggestad  and  Rhoades's  proposition  that mobility  is an element  of " industry
structure  but rather  reflect  conduct  that the theory  would  predict  to arise  from certain  market  structures".
This  result also  corroborates  the earlier  result  that found  a positive  relationship  between  and  concentration
and  profits. The  average  fixed  asset size  of the top 5 banks  also has a strong  negative  impact  on competition.
This result  suggests  that the  branch  network  and equipment  owned  by the top 5 banks  are  negatively  affecting
competition  in the market  and  probably  deter  new  comers  to enter  into  the  retail  banking  market." 7 It may
also be an indication  of reputation  effects  which  are  thought  to be significant  in banking.  As expected  market
growth  is strongly  related  to competition  which  is line  with  most  other  competition  studies.
17Bodehom  (1990) also finds similar  results.32
VII. POLICY  IMPLICATIONS  AND  CONCLUSIONS
The  results  of this study  have a number  of policy  implications.  The  first is that although  reforms
reduced  concentration  and  this would  lead one  to expect  that the cooperative  attitude  and  tradition  of
understanding  among  the banks  is now  much  weaker,  both the casual  observations  and  the results  of this
study  suggest  otherwise.  Leading  banks  are  still able coordinate  their  pricing  decisions  overtly. For
example,  as recent  as March 1993,  the  general  manager  of a large  public  bank commented  that they  lowered
interest  rates  in agreement  with  the leading  large  banks." 8 Another  noteworthy  example  is that in October
1992,  the public  banks  have  been  directed  to raise  their  deposit  rates  when  large  banks  set their  rates  below
the smaller  banks  and below  the inflation  rate,  which  reflects  the  recognition  of collusive  pricing  by the
authorities  and  their attempts  to deal  with  it.19 These  developments  clearly  suggest  that the high  profitability
in the sector  -while  operating  costs  were  rising  -have  been  primarily  due the  uncompetitive  pricing  of banks
and  not their efficiency,  which  are  captured  by the equations  estimated.  Hence,  the  deregulation  and
liberalization  process  that started  in 1980  should  be continued  and enhanced.
Second,  and related  to the first one is that  the size and  type  of the entrants  is as important  as the entry
itself  and that future  policies  should  take  this factor  into account.  The  findings  of this study  indicate  that
entry  at small  scale  has not been  sufficient  to alter  interfirm  relationships  in the  market. While  it may  be
argued  that reforming  the  financial  system  should  be regarded  as a process  and entry  will  increase
competition  overtime,  it is not clear  that entry  at small  scale  will  deliver  that result. Atiyas  and Ersel  (1993)
report  from  their survey  finding  that small  banks  were  not planning  to increase  their customer  base and that
" 8Reported  in a major  daily  newspaper's  economics  page  in a short  article  entitled  "there  is no state  intervention
on interest  rates"  dated  March  1, 1993.
" 9It is  probably  the case  that  the authorities  viewed cuts in deposit rates as too excessive. Otherwise,  they would not have
intervened  as they  tolerated  coliusion  among  banks  in  the past.33
they  would  continue  to work  with large  firms. This implies  that new  banks,  at least for now,  are  not planning
to challenge  institutions  in retail  banking  business  and in line  with  this strategy  they  did not establish  offices
beyond  the  three  large  cities. This  means  that new  banks  will  not be a factor  of competition  in the retail
banking  market  and  hence  they  could  not be expected  to influence  the market  structure.
The  unwillingness  of new  financial  institutions  to enter  into  the  retail  banking  market  also
demonstrates  the existence  of non-regulatory  barriers. These  may  be due  to distortions  caused  by the earlier
interest  rate and regulatory  policies  which  led  to excessive  bank  branches  and emphasis  on size  by the banks.
As noted  already,  between  1960-1980  with  the distorted  price  of capital  and  rising  inflation  it was  very
profitable  to collect  deposits  by opening  new  branches.  However,  with  the deregulation  of interest  rates  in
1980  this situation  changed  and capital  became  expensive  and  eliminated  rents  that could  be earned  by
collecting  deposits  and simply  investing  them  into  real assets  or other  profitable  activities.  In the  two
competition  equations  estimated,  the size  of the large  banks  exerted  negative  and significant  impact  on
competition  which  may  indicate  that the size  of the banks  has now  become  a mobility  barrier  in the system. 0
Such  a proposition  seems  to be in line  with Caves  and  Porter's  (1977)  contribution  which  generalized  Bain's
original  theory  of entry  barriers  to include  mobility  barriers  which  makes  the  point  that competition  not only
depends  on new  entry  but "structural  restraints  on firms'  abilities  to change  their  market  shares"  or mobility
within  an industry  as well. Hence,  both the entry  and  mobility  barriers  need  to be taken  into account  in
promoting  competition  in the system.
Given  these  considerations,  a procompetitive  policy  would  need  to facilitate  inter-bank  rivalry  among
the  leading  banks  which  continue  to dominate  the  system. This  in turn  requires  the entry  or creation  of new
20Switching  costs may also be a barrier  to mobility. As discussed before, the number of savings accounts controlled by the
large banks after the reforms actually increased  which seems to indicate that proximity  to bank offices was an important factor in
consumers' choice. See Dernine (1993), Giovannini and Mayer (1991) and Klemperer (1987).34
banks  with a reasonable  number  of branches.  In other  words,  what  is needed  is entry  at a certain  size. In the
short  term  this could  be achieved  by breaking  up and  privatizing  public  banks,  except  the Agricultural  Bank
due its special  position  in the system. Breaking  up public  banks  is not likely  to lead  to welfare  losses  because
there  seems  to be no scale  economies  in banking  in general  and in the banking  sector  in Turkey  as most
recently  demonstrated  by Cilli  (1993). Hence,  breaking  up public  banks,  currently  representing  30 percent  of
sectoral  assets (excluding  the  Agricultural  Bank  and 3 development  banks),  can  easily  result  in the creation  of
some 15-20  new  banks  with 40-50  branches  which  will  reduce  concentration  and  facilitate  mobility  in the
retail  banking  market.
Such  a strategy  is also  likely  to improve  efficiency  in the sector. Recent  studies  by Bauer  et.al
(1993), Berger(1993),  Berger  et.al (1993),  Berger  and  Humprey  (1991, 1992a,b)  indicate  that there  are
significant  amount of -X- inefficiencies  in banking.  In other  words,  differences  in managerial  ability  to
minimize  costs  and  maximize  profits  seem  to be larger  than the  cost effects  of the choice  of scale  and scope
of the output  level. If so, creating  banks  with  40-50  branches  by breaking  up public  banks  prior  to
privatization  is likely  to improve  their governance  structures  and  their  productive  efficiency.  The  implication
for the Turkish  banking  market  is that banks  with  relatively  large  branch  networks  should  not be permitted  to
merge. Rhoades  (1993)  for example,  finds  that banks  involved  in horizontal  mergers  in the  US during  the
1981-1986  period  did not realize  efficiency  gains. The  recent  mergers  between  Denizbank  and  Emlak
Bankasi  and Ogretmenler  Bankasi  and  Halkbank  are  not likely  to contribute  to sectoral  efficiency  gains,  but
are  bound  to increase  concentration  and should  be avoided  in the future.
Promoting  the entry  of non-banks  and local  banks  would  also  be desirable  and there  is a need  to
increase  the number  of institutions  that competes  for deposits. Contrary  to views  expressed  by some  bankers
and policymakers  the  market  is not overbanked.  In most OECD  countries  savings  and  loan associations,35
building  societies  and cooperative  banks actively  compete  and are  numerous  (table  3). In Germany  for
example,  there  are some  280 commercial  banks,  about  558 savings  banks,  and about  2800 co-operative
banks. In Spain,  the  number  of commercial  banks  is 160  while  the  number  of savings  and cooperative  banks
is close  to 175.21  In Turkey,  such  a variety  of institutions  is not available  to depositors  and  their
establishment  should  be actively  encouraged.  The  first step  to fill  this gap might  be the creation  of
institutions  for housing  finance  and the  development  of a mortgage  market  and entry  of new  institutions
should  not be restricted.
Finally,  it is worthwhile  noting  that the experience  of both  the developed  and developing  countries
which  implemented  financial  deregulation  and  liberalization  policies  during  the 1980s  suggest  promoting
competition  involves  striking  a balance  between  a number  of potentially  conflicting  objectives  and the  risk
financial  deregulation  brings. 22 In most countries  public  policy  objective  has been  to maintain  financial
market  stability  and investor  protection  while  achieving  productive  and allocative  efficiency  through
deregulation.  However,  as pointed  out by Mayer  and Vives  (1993)  that " Competition  in banking  is not like
competition  in sausage  production.  There  are  risks  and distortions  associated  with  bank competition  that
make  the  welfare  effects  of increased  competition  uncertain"'  particularly  when  there  is deposit  insurance.  In
a number  of papers and  most recently  Stiglitz  (1993)  also  pointed  out that financial  markets  are  incomplete
and market  failures  are a reality  which  implies  that there  would  always  be a case  for government  intervention.
What  these  arguments  imply  is that owing  to the  conflicting  objectives  banking  will  need  to be
regulated  and  be different  from  other  industries  which  in turn will  limit  the intensity  of competition.
However,  this does  not mean  that present  low level  of competition  in banking  in Turkey  might  be or should
21For more details about the structure of banking market in OECD countries see Canals (1993) and OECD (1993).
22For  a review of the experience of developing  countries with financial liberalization  and deregulation  see Caprio et al
(1993), for developed  countries see Mayer and Vives (1993), Giovannini (1993), OECD (1992), and Khoury (1990).36
be acceptable.  Even  if the best of conditions  are  created  for a competitive  system,  owing  to the conflicting
objectives  and  regulations  imposed  on  the financial  sector  profitability  will  be higher  than  other  industries.
For  example,  Neven  (1993)  and Vives  (1991)  do not consider  European  banking  sector(s)  to be perfectly
competitive  although  sectoral  profitability  is far below  than  in the Turkish  one. Hence,  there  is ample  room
for competition  in the Turkish  market  although  it is not to be expected  that increased  competition  will
approximate  ideal  conditions.  A corollary  to these  arguments  is that the  regulatory  framework  and
supervisory  capacity  of the authorities  will  be crucial  factors  in striking  a balance  between  competition,
system  stability  and  efficiency  and  with  increased  globalization  of financial  markets  this task will  not become
easier.37
Table 1. Number of Commercial Banks and Measures of Concentration
1980  1983  1986  1989  1991
Number of Banks (Excluding  development  and
investment  banks)  36  39  49  53  55
-State Owned  8  9  8  8  8
-Private  24  19  24  24  26
-Foreign  4  11  17  21  21
Number of Branches  5894  6221  6337  6579  6460
Concentration Measures (m percent)
CR3D  53  57  57  45  40
CR5D  69  71  68  61  55
CR8D  82  83  86  85  82
CRIOD  88  88  86  85  82
CR3L  56  53  55  49  44
CR5L  70  65  69  60  56
CR8L  82  78  81  74  71
CRIOL  87  83  85  80  78
CR3A  50  51  48  45  40
CR5A  64  63  62  58  54
CR8A  76  76  76  73  69
CR1OA  83  81  81  79  77
CR3SD  55  61  63  50  42
CR5SD  72  74  76  66  58
CR8SD  83  84  86  81  75
CR1OSD  90  90  92  89  83
CR3NSD  55  60  68  65  62
CR5NSD  70  72  79  75  74
CR8NSD  84  85  92  87  87
CRIONSD  89  90  98  93  94
Sources: The Banks Association  of Turkey, The Central Bank and own calculations.
Variables:  CRD = Deposit Concentration  (3, 5, 8, 10 banks), CRL = Loan Concentration  (3, 5, 8, 10 banks); CRA =
Asset Concentration (3, 5, 8, 10 banks); CRSD = Savings  Deposit Level Concentration (3, 5, 8, 10 banks); CRNSD
Savings Deposit  Number Concentration  (3, 5, 8, 10 banks).38
Table 2. Measures  of Financial  Deegenin!  and Stocks  of Financial  Assets
Ml  M1/GDP
Year  SFA  (rL.  Billion)  M2  SFA/GDP  (percent)  M2/GDP
1980  1,224  738  924  28.3  17.1  21.4
1981  2,148  1,019  1,710  33.5  15.9  26.7
1982  3,335  1,407  2,679  38.8  16.4  31.1
1983  4,339  2,084  3,477  37.6  18.1  30.2
1984  7,304  2,448  5,493  40.1  13.4  30.2
1985  12,059  3,420  8,540  43.8  12.4  31.0
1986  18,356  5,357  8,682  46.7  13.6  31.3
1987  30,519  8,682  17,702  52.4  14.9  30.4
1988  49,086  11,311  27,195  48.7  11.2  27.0
1989  86,631  19,560  47,142  51.6  11.7  28.1
1990  133,379  31,399  71,571  47.7  11.2  25.6
Variables:
SFA:  Stock  of Financial  Assets  including  currency  in circulation,  deposits,  special  finance  house  participation
accounts,  corporate  bonds,  treasury  bills,  mutual  fund  participation  shares.
MI = Currency in circulation + Sight Deposits
M2 = MI + Time Deposits
Source:  Akkurt  et.al.  (1992).39
Table 3. Bank Profitability
GEM  OC  NEM  PBT  Number of
As % of Total Assets  Banks
Turkey  1983  5.0  3.6  1.3  1.0  39
1984  5.7  3.3  2.4  1.9  41
1985  3.8  2.9  0.9  0.6  44
1986  5.4  2.8  2.6  1.9  49
1987  7.3  2.8  4.5  3.0  50
1988  8.5  3.3  5.2  3.5  52
1989  7.4  3.8  3.6  2.4  53
1990  12.3  5.1  7.2  3.6  56
Spain  1990  5.1  3.0  2.1  1.5  160
Australia  1990  2.5  1.6  0.9  0.4  1165
Italy  1990  4.1  2.7  1.4  0.8  188
Holland  1990  1.2  0.4  0.8  0.2  173
Belgium  1990  1.7  1.2  0.5  0.3  91
Denmark  1990  2.9  2.0  0.9  -0.2  119
Germany  1990  3.1  2.0  1.1  0.6  281
OECD  1990  3.2  2.0  1.2  0.7  --
Sources: Bank Profitability  (OECD, 1992), the Banks Association of Turkey.
Variables:
GEM: Gross Economic Margin = Interest Received - Interest Paid + Other Income (net).
OC: Operating Costs.
NEM: Net Economnic  Margin = GEM - OC.
PBT:  Profit Before Taxes = NEM - Other Expenses(net) equal to ROA.
Total Assets:  Arithmetic averages of the end of year values.40
Table 4
(Dependent  Variable is Return on Assets,  ROA)
OLS Results
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistics
C  -0.10407  -2.15
CA  0.13340  6.87
TA  5.498E-10  1.27
LA  -0.02217  -6.00
DT  0.006066  2.30
OEA  -0.174486  -3.20
MDGR  0.00013  0.05
CR5  0.172756  2.98




(Dependent Variable is Return  on Assets, ROA)
OLS Results
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistics
C  -0.097  -1.97
MSHARE  0.0137  0.548
CA  0.135833  5.47
TA  6.294E-10  0.656
LA  -0.02261  5.97
DT  0.00653  2.34
OEA  -0.172673  -3.15
MDGR  0.000190  0.076
CR5  0.160317  2.576




(Dependent  Variable is Return on Assets,  ROA)
OLS Results
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistics
C  -0.00454  1.26
MSHARE  0.037221  1.56
CA  0.123172  6.17
TA  -6.318E-10  0.54
LA  -0.02046  5.44
DT  0.007065  2.52
OEA  -0.177827  -3.19
MDGR  0.001463  0.59
CR5




(Dependent  Variable is Return on Assets,  ROA)
OLS Results
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistics
C  -0.14677  -2.06
CA  0.125419  5.47
TA  6.1214E10  1.13
LA  -0.02071  -4.60
DT  0.008158  2.86
OEA  -0.213746  -3.80
MDGR  0.000863  0.30
CR5  0.239629  3.44




(Dependent Variable  is Return  on Assets, ROA)
OLS Results
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistics
C  -0.12324  -1.54
MSHARE  0.096954  1.54
CA  0.148375  5.44
TA  6.412E10  0.85
LA  -0.02495  -4.95
DT  0.010267  3.26
OEA  -0.191380  -3.29
MDGR  0.001398  0.50
CR5  0.198141  2.66




(Dependent  Variable is Rl: Mobility  Among  the Top 10 Banks)
Tobit Results
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistics
C  8.1069  2.2610
ENT (-5)  -.1274  -1.8081
CR5  -13.4431  -2.4905
AVG  -0.2088E-06  -4.2828
MDGR  .0349  4.1027
(Dependent  Variable is R2:  Mobility  Among  All Banks)
Tobit Results
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistics
C  2.5356  2.98
ENT (-5)  1.6780  1.23
CR5  -6.8759  -3.76
AVG  -1.6884  -2.95
MDGR  .1349  3.1146
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